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Introduction. The postwar years were a time of great changes for 
homosexuals in the United States. The conjunction of the fear and anxiety of 
the first Cold War years, negative stereotypes held as scientific truths explaining 
homosexuality, and the greater awareness people had about the existence of 
gays and lesbians resulted in an environment of misunderstanding and 
persecution. Within this environment, positive scientific contributions toward 
the understanding of homosexuality such as Kinsey's report were twisted to fit 
the larger societal preconceptions, and even influenced the creation of 
legislation aimed at eradicating homosexuals from the government. 
A protagonist in this postwar environment of fear and anxiety was a 
senator named Joseph McCarthy, who ascended in politics through lies and 
slander, and became most famous for his relentless persecution of 'infiltrated' 
communists, liberals, and dissenters. Assisting the senator in his crusade was a 
legal infrastructure previously laid out by committees who had taken the cause 
before him, the most important of which was the famous House of Un-
American Activities Committee. 
Despite the great number of literature written about the senator, there 
are relatively few studies that deal with McCarthy's persecution of homosexuals. 
Some historians mention it in the context of his other persecutions, and as an 
example of one of the many groups who suffered under the senator. In The Age 
of Anxiety: McCarlhyism to Terrorism, Haynes Johnson stated that the senator, and 
his chief council Roy Cohn 
took it as their mission to search for, and have fired, all 
homosexuals in the government. Page after page efter page of the 
transcripts consisted of witnesses being grilled about their 
sexual preferences, while McCarthy and Cohn dropped 
numerous innuendos about homosexuality to other witnesses. 
(my emphasis)! 
Johnson qualified McCarthy's search of homosexuals as "obsessive," and 
although his book centered on the senator and his political life, he devoted 
several pages to McCarthy's persecution of homosexuals, while using as 
evidence the transcripts from the committee that the senator chaired. 2 
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David K. Johnson differs from Haynes in that he focused on the 
general persecution of homosexuals during the postwar years; persecution 
which he identified as the "lavender scare." Johnson also has a more nuanced 
view of the role McCarthy played in these persecutions, deeming the senator a 
secondary figure. Although the author acknowledged that gay people had the 
impression that McCarthy was behind the gay purges, he also realized that the 
senator was not very interested in the matter, and did not become involved in 
the congressional efforts to rid the nation's capital of 'sexual undesirables.'3 
The present research specifically focuses on Senator McCarthy and his 
political actions against gays and lesbians. Concerning this subject, it is my 
argument that homosexuals were not heavily persecuted by the senator from 
Wisconsin. The records from McCarthy's committee clearly show how 
restrained the senator was in his pursuit of homosexuals, since out of the more 
than three hundred witnesses that McCarthy cited in his executive sessions, only 
three cases dealt with homosexuality and only one witness was called because of 
his sexual orientation. It appears that the senator was mostly interested in 
uncovering subversion and cases of disloyalty within government departments, 
and homosexuality was used either as an example of how ineffective these 
departments were in detecting undesirables, or as an element of pressure to use 
against a witness. Although the senator expressed his desire to rid the 
government offices of homosexuals in more than one occasion, he did not 
dedicate his efforts to this end. The way McCarthy viewed, and dealt with 
homosexuals in his hearings was influenced by the congressional report on the 
Emplqyment ef Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government, which was 
published in 1950. This report maintained that gays and lesbians constituted a 
security risk for their propensity to being blackmailed, which made them security 
1 Haynes Johnson, The Age of Anxiety: McCarthyism to Terrorism (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 
2005), 320. 
2 Ibid., 320-29. 
3 David K Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the 
Federal Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 2-9. 
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risks. Notwithstanding this, McCarthy did not seem to consider homosexuals as 
much of a threat as communists. 
In order to arrive at this conclusion, I analyzed both the context of the 
times and the political actions taken by the senator towards homosexuals. The 
senator's conduct can not be better observed than in the transcripts of the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on 
Government Operations. This committee was chaired by McCarthy from 1953 
to 1954, and within it the senator enjoyed full and unprecedented latitude to go 
after his enemies. When analyzing the context I deemed important to observe 
American society's conceptions of homosexuality in the postwar years, as well 
as McCarthy's ascension to power and the legal infrastructure that he had at his 
disposal to deal with homosexuals. Only after taking into consideration these 
contextual elements could I make a proper evaluation of the actions of the 
senator from Wisconsin towards the 'lavender menace.' 
The Red Scare and its Legal Heritage. McCarthy's rise to power was 
achieved within the context of the first years of the Cold War, and the radical 
phase known as the "red scare." Only days before McCarthy gave his famous 
speech at Wheeling, the New York Times was reporting that a British scientist 
named Klaus Fuchs had given atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. Fuchs had 
been involved in the Manhattan Project, and was then working in Great Britain 
in an atomic energy facility. The scientist's betrayal was discovered by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations, which considered that Fuchs's action had 
given the Soviet Union the tools to develop the atom bomb, while also 
advancing the communist country's position toward developing the first 
hydrogen bomb.4 Fuchs's case was not the first dealing with internal espionage, 
it was preceded by the Hiss-Chambers congressional hearings, which established 
that high ranking State Department official Alger Hiss had also been involved in 
selling secrets to the Soviet Union.s In charge of Hiss' congressional hearings 
was a congressional task force created from the ashes of the Dies Committee in 
1945, named House of Un-American Activities Committee. HUAC had been 
created to investigate subversion within the United States.6 
With dubious claims to constitutionality, HUAC set a legal precedent 
for further congressional subcommittees to take on the role of judicial 
4 William S. White, "British Jail Atom Scientist As a Spy After Tip By F.B.I.; He Knew 
of Hydrogen Bomb," New York Times (February 4, 1950): 1-2. 
5 John G. Adams, Without Precedent; The story ef the death efMcCartbyism (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1983), 24. 
6 Carl Beck, Contentpt ef Congress: A Study ef the Prosecutions Initiated by the Committee on Un-
American Activities, 1945-1957 (New Orleans: The Phauser Press, 1959), 18-19. 
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investigations.? The contempt citation was HUAC's main weapon, which 
although little used in the past, became employed to its fullest extent by this 
congressional committee and the subsequent ones of its type. Contempt was 
established in case the summoned party failed to either appear, provide material 
requested, or even answer a question. The House committee's procedures raised 
questions of constitutionality, since they often dashed with individual rights of 
freedom of speech, protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
self incrimination as cited in the first, fourth, and fifth amendments of the 
Constitution. 8 
The procedure for the enactment of these contempt citations was 
almost as controversial as their use. The committee in charge elevated a 
contempt resolution based on a report elaborated to the House of 
Representatives, and after this report the House voted on whether to adopt the 
resolution or not. If the resolution passed, then the Attorney General was in 
charge of prosecuting the accused individual. The problem was that most of 
the hearings from which the report was made were conducted in executive 
sessions by the committee in charge; thus the full House had to vote based on 
the information given by the committee acting as the prosecuting party and 
without any other information available.9 
With objectives as broad and subjective as 'un-Americanism' and 
subversion, and with dubious legal methods which were upheld by the lower 
courts and ignored by the Supreme Court when challenged, HUAC enjoyed 
great latitude to prosecute communism and other perceived social evils. 10 It is 
clear that the liberty of action enjoyed by committees such as HUAC was 
encouraged by the perceived threats of the times, since added to the cases of 
internal espionage including Hiss, Fuchs and the Rosenbergs was the possibility 
that the Soviet Union could acquire the hydrogen bomb first, or even more 
frightening, a communist China. Whereas China becoming communist and 
engaging in pacts of mutual collaboration with the Soviet Union discredited 
Truman's containment policy, the possible Soviet development of the hydrogen 
bomb threatened the security of the nation and its citizens. The environment of 
fear that the hydrogen bomb created was reflected in statements by Albert 
Einstein declaring that total annihilation was possible, and the famous 1951 
7 Prior to this, congressional committees were used for the control of corruption in the 
executive organs of the government and no enforcement powers were previewed in the 
Constitution for them. For further reference see Beck, Contempt of Congress, 3-5. 
~Beck, Contempt of Congress, 17-18. 
9 Ibid., 21. 
10 Ibid., 13, 37. 
Civil Defense educational film shown to school children about "ducking" and 
"covering" in case the bomb exploded.1 t 
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This environment of fear helped generate enormous power for anyone 
who was willing to take up the anti-communist cause, as the legal infrastructure 
to prosecute subversives was already laid out, and a scared population would 
give such crusader enough political support. Joseph McCarthy proved to be one 
able to exploit this environment to his advantage, and as it is known he was able 
to use this power against alleged communists. Nevertheless the question that 
has not been conclusively answered hitherto is whether the senator also used 
this power to prosecute other groups, such as homosexuals, and whether he 
would have been able to do so. The answers to these questions greatly depend 
on how people viewed homosexuality during these years, and how acceptable 
could have been to prosecute homosexuals; these points are ultimately what the 
next sections of this research will address. 
Homosexuality in the Postwar Years. The postwar years were a rime 
of profound changes for homosexuals in the United States. Gay communities 
had been visible earlier in the century in cities such as New York, where "pansy 
shows" hosted by drag queens were the rage of the late twenties' speakeasies. 
However the lifting of Prohibition in the early thirties did away with the 
underworld nightlife in which the gay subculture thrived, and the establishment 
of licor licenses for bars gave authorities the power to subject the issuance of 
licenses to conditions that they stipulated for them. Within this context 
authorities pressured bars to prohibit entrance to homosexuals, as part of an 
agenda to "clean up" the city. Furthermore, the onset of the Great Depression 
also brought about a masculinization of society, as the adult male breadwinners 
were loosing their jobs, and their sense of masculinity.12 Partly as a consequence 
of these developments, representations of homosexuality began to be banned 
in all public spheres, with the Motion Picture Association censuring all 
depictions of "lewdness" and "obscenity" in its 1934 code.13 This growing 
marginalization of homosexuals did not arrive without its ills, since the lack of 
visibility of gay people helped spur all kinds of myths referring to their 
11 
"The Texts of the Agreements Concluded Between the Soviet Union and Communist 
China," Ne1v York Times, February 15, 1950, 11; "Einstein Sees Bid To 'Annihilation' In 
Hydrogen Bomb," New York Times, February 13, 1950, 1; video "Duck and Cover 1951 
Civil Defense Film With Bert the Turtle" accessed online on November 20, 2009 at 
http:/ /www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKqXu-5jw60. 
12 George Chauncey, Gqy New 1'ork: Gender, Urban Culture, and the lv1akings of the Gqy Male 
World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 353-58. 
13 John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority 
in the United States, 1940-1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 19. 
condition. By the forties, psychologists considered homosexuals mentally 
unstable and sexually immature, and in the sensationalist stories in the press 
they were depicted as dangerous to their society.14 
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The progression toward the marginalization of homosexuals was 
interrupted during World War II, when many gays and lesbians found a 
relatively 'freer' environment for their desires in the military. Although the 
military had a policy for not allowing gays and lesbians to serve, it became a 
policy difficult to enforce for various reasons. The psychological screening 
examinations of the draftees were designed to detect character deficiencies, 
however they rested on stereotypical assumptions of what a homosexual was 
like. This had the result that only those "visibly" effeminate men and masculine 
women were weeded out, allowing for a majority of the homosexual population 
to be drafted undetected. Once inside, the demands of the war made it even 
more difficult to discharge a combatant in the middle of an assignment. 
Moreover the strict segregation of the sexes, laxity of moral constraints due to 
the circumstances of the battles, and deep emotional bonds among troops 
enabled homosexuals to express themselves, with their heterosexual mates 
looking the other way or even experimenting in some cases. is 
Another element that spurred the visibility of homosexuals at this time 
was the role of scientists in their search of knowledge on topics virtually 
untouched before. One of these pioneers was zoologist Alfred Kinsey, who 
during twenty eight years compiled data gathered from more than ten thousand 
extensive interviews on the sexual behavior of men and women. His first book 
Sexual Behavior in the Human Male was published in 1948, and was followed by 
Sexual Behavior in the Human Female in 19 53. Kinsey's first volume was a success 
beyond the most optimistic previous expectations, and the zoologist and 
sexologist quickly became a household name associated with sex. 16 
Kinsey's report contained many controversial 'discoveries' about the 
sexual behavior of the American population, but possibly none surpassed the 
revelation that more than one third (my emphasis) of the adult male population 
had had at least one homosexual encounter in their lives.17 As a consequence of 
14 Ibid., 16; Senate, Emplqyment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Peroerts in Government, 81 '' 
Cong., 2°d sess., 1950, S. Doc. 241, p.3; Chauncey, Gqy New York, 359. 
15 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 24-31; a gay novel published in 1950 reflects this aspect of 
the military as well, narrating the love story of a young officer and his commander of 
the navy. For further reference see James Barr, Quatrefail (Boston: Alyson Publications, 
1950). 
16 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics., 34. 
17 The precise figure was 37%, and it referred to the number of adult males who had 
experienced during their adult life at least one orgasm product of a homosexual 
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these revealing findings, Kinsey proposed a continuum to understand sexual 
attraction, which encompassed a numerical scale going from exclusive 
heterosexuality (0) to exclusive homosexuality (6), with gradations in between. ls 
Other conclusions of the report contradicted the prevailing views on 
homosexuality as articulated by psychologists, which explained that it was a 
mental disease. By showing that a high percentage of the male population 
engaged in homosexual activity, even when this was repressed by society, Kinsey 
concluded that homosexuality was as much part of human sexuality as 
heterosexuality. In reference to this he stated: 
In view of the data which we now have on the incidence and 
frequency of the homosexual, and in particular on its co-
existence with the heterosexual in the lives of a considerable 
portion of the male population, it is difficult to maintain the 
view that psychosexual reactions between individuals of the 
same sex are rare and therefore abnormal or unnatural, or that 
they constitute within themselves evidence of neuroses or even 
psychoses. 19 
Kinsey received mixed reviews within academic circles, with some 
giving lavish praises to his book, and others debunking it as sensational. In a 
book titled American Sexual Behavior and The Kinsry &port, the authors referred to 
the sexologist as having "done for sex what Columbus did for geography."20 
Nevertheless the same authors indicated that psychologists were not too pleased 
by the scientist's findings, arguing that that the commonality of homosexual 
behavior did not make homosexuality normal.21 Although Kinsey's report was a 
commercial success, a number of people criticized the sexologist for the 
perceived immorality of his conclusions, and many of the scientist's findings 
were misinterpreted to fit the societal's understandings of sexuality, particularly 
those having to do with homosexuality.22 
encounter, be this anal or oral penetration, or mutual masturbation. For further 
reference see Alfred Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Philadelphia: W.B. 
Saunders Company, 1948), 623. 
1s Ibid., 617, 637. 
19 Ibid., 659. 
20 Morris L. Ernst & David Loth, American Sexual Behavior and The Kinsry Report (New 
York: Educational Book Co., 1948), 11. 
21 Ibid., 180-82. 
22 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 36; David Johnson, Lavender Scare, 88-89. 
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Psychology maintained its privileged position in being the science that 
explained abnormal sexuality, and according to psychologists the "sexual 
deviance" of the homosexual not only influenced his sex life, but also his other 
behaviors. Accordingly the homosexual was not only a sex pervert but also a 
wholly mentally dysfunctional person. This view of the "sick" homosexual was 
a shift from the notion that homosexuality was just an immoral behavior that 
anyone could engage in, and by the mid fifties laws began reflecting this shift by 
prescribing psychological treatment in sentences to gay people.23 
Within the political context of the red scare, Kinsey's findings gave to 
the people and authorities the understanding that there were more homosexuals 
than assumed, which led to an intensification of efforts aimed at finding and 
arresting them. By this time, the former characterization of all gay males as 
gender deviants had changed, and works like the Kinsey report demonstrated 
that there were masculine homosexuals just as there were feminine lesbians.24 
Anyone could be a homosexual, just as anyone could be a communist; thus 
appearances no longer applied as the bases of identification. The charged 
environment of fear and hysteria of the Cold War was turned towards same sex 
oriented people, and the government began to take action. As a result of this 
the police augmented its persecution of homosexuals and the government 
began to impose, strengthen or in some cases just enforce previous rules dealing 
v.rith the employment of homosexuals in government jobs.25 
Security Risks. Another unintended consequence of the Kinsey 
report might have been the need that the government saw in addressing 
homosexuality, although not in the way the scientist had hoped for. According 
to Kinsey the commission of the homosexual act had to be de-penalized, due to 
the vast number of people who practiced it. He recommended judges who 
considered a homosexual case to "keep in mind that nearly 40 percent of all the 
other males in the town could be arrested at some time in their lives for similar 
activity."26 
The government's response to the homosexual threat was seen two 
years after the publication of Kinsey's study, in the congressional report titled 
"Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government," 
produced by the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. 
This report was aimed at recommending certain measures with the purpose of 
23 D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 16; Chauncey, Gay New York, 359; Beth Bailey, Sex in the 
Heartland (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 60. 
24 Johnson, Lavender Scare, 54, 88-89; Kinsey, Sexual Behavior, 615. 
25 Chauncey, Gay Ne1v York., 360; D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 41-44; Johnson, Lavender 
Scare, 4-5. 
26 Kinsey, Sexual Behavior, 664. 
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weeding out any 'sexual undesirables' from government positions. It was a 
senate subcommittee on investigations vlithin the aforementioned committee 
which carried out the pertinent hearings held in executive session. Although 
Joseph McCarthy was part of the main committee, he chose not to form part 
of the hearings by recusing himself (my emphasis). The New York Times reported 
that the senator from Wisconsin "bowed out of the inquiry to avoid being in a 
position of judging his own accusations," -which knowing the senator it is hard 
to believe- and that Republican senator from Kansas Andrew F. Schoeppel was 
going to take McCarthy's place on the panel.27 The chairmanship of the 
investigative committee fell on Senator Clyde R. Hoey of North Carolina, who 
was not particularly thrilled with the honor.28 The conclusions of this report 
were very influential in the way authorities viewed homosexuality thenceforth, 
as the later interrogations of homosexuals by McCarthy will show. 
For its inquiries, the committee relied on the definitions and concepts 
of homosexuality stated by the times' "eminent physicians and psychiatrists, 
who are recognized authorities on this subject."29 From the testimony of these 
specialists, the report established as standard definitions sex perverts as "those 
who engage in unnatural sexual acts," and homosexuals as those "perverts who 
may be broadly defined as persons of either sex who as adults engage in sexual 
activities with persons of the same sex." The report also marked an agreement 
among the specialists interviewed in that homosexuality was brought about by 
"psychological rather than physical causes."The report also categorized two 
types of homosexuals, the latent and the overt. A latent homosexual was 
defined as someone who consciously or not had homosexual tendencies but did 
not practice them; however the overt homosexuals were those who acted on 
their desires, and they were to be the focus of the committee. The task was 
difficult since "contrary to a common belief, all homosexual males do not have 
feminine mannerisms, nor do all female homosexuals display masculine 
characteristics." 
The committee asserted that according to the authorities on the matter 
"most sex deviates respond to psychiatric treatment and can be cured if they 
have a genuine desire to be cured;' therefore: 
27 "Pervert Inquiry Ordered," New York Times, June 15, 1950, 6. 
28 Senator Hoey was an elder Southern gentleman who was not used to discussing 
matters like these; his lack of knowledge on the matter was evident, as it showed when 
he allegedly asked chief counselor Flanagan in private about lesbians "can you please tell 
me, what can two women possibly do?," as cited in David K. Johnson, The Lavender 
Scare, 102-3. 
29 The following quotes are derived from Senate, Empl01ment ef Homosexuals and Other Sex 
Perverts in Government, 81" Cong., znd sess., 1950, S. Doc. 241, pp. 2-5. 
The subcommittee sincerely believes that persons afflicted with 
sexual desires which result in the engaging in overt acts of 
perversion should be considered as proper cases for medical 
and psychiatric treatment. However, sex perverts, like all other 
persons who by their overt acts violate moral codes and laws 
and the accepted standards of conduct, must be treated as 
transgressors and dealt with accordingly.30 
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As it can be read, the above recommendation seemed contradictory of itself, 
since although it proposed psychological treatment for the "afflicted" people, it 
also recommended a proper punishment by the law for "sex perverts." It almost 
seems to make an implicit distinction between "persons afflicted with sexual 
desires" resulting in acts of perversion, and sex perverts; however it falls short 
from such distinction, since it concludes by stating that all violators should be 
punished. It follows from the language that homosexuals who were caught in 
sexual acts needed to be both treated and punished; an outcome that became 
standard in the statutes of states like Kansas during the fifties and sixties.31 
Particularly on the matter that the committee was set to deal with, 
which was the employment of homosexuals in government positions, three 
main reasons were given that justified the unsuitability of these individuals. The 
first reason was that homosexuals constituted security risks, since the social 
stigma of their sin provided a fertile ground for foreign spies to exploit, and get 
secrets from the government. As an example of this, the committee mentioned 
the case of Captain Raedl, who was "chief of the Austrian counterintelligence 
service in 1912." He allegedly gave the Russians military secrets after they 
discovered that he was a homosexual and blackmailed him. Accordingly he had 
also destroyed information on the Russians, causing the misinformation of both 
German and Austrian commands as to the Russian military plans when the 
Great War started. 32 Senator McCarthy made use of this example during one 
30 Ibid. 
31 General Statutes of Kansas (Annotated), sec. 21-907 (Corrick 1949); indication of a 1955 
supplement, sections 62-1534, 35, 36, and 37 with previsions for psychological 
treatment is given in the sentencing of Kansas v. Gardner, Sedgwick Co. A-69036 (1957). 
32 Ibid., 5; this was in fact the only concrete example that the senate committee could 
find on homosexuals as security risks (although it also mentioned vaguely alleged cases 
in Nazi Germany), and closer scrutiny shows that parts of Captain Redl's story were 
fabricated and that the blackmail was motivated by greed more than by the need to get 
military secrets, for more information refer to David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 
108-9. 
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executive hearing of the committee he chaired, concerning one of the few cases 
he had dealing with homosexuality.33 
The second reason given was homosexuals' "lack of emotional 
stability" and "weakness of their moral fiber," which also made them a security 
risk since they were more "susceptible to the blandishments of the foreign 
espionage agent."34 Homosexuals were not believed to be strong enough to 
sustain an interrogation, and according to the committee they could not be 
trusted to keep secrets, as they liked to talk about themselves. Of the three 
reasons given, this was the most directly related to the assumed intrinsic 
maladies of the homosexual, since the other two had more to do with their 
reactions to societal pressures. It also spoke to the general unsuitability that gays 
and lesbians presented, stereotypically considered the same as drunkards and 
other criminals. 
Lastly the third motive that validated the rejection and expulsion of 
homosexuals from government positions was a belief that they had a tendency 
to gather among themselves others 'like them.' This belief spoke to both their 
assumed unsuitability and the potential danger that they constituted for 
American security. The committee thought that as a general rule homosexuals 
hired other homosexuals; but even when they could not do so they were still 
able to spread their "corrosive influence" to otherwise normal workers. 
Regarding this point the report expressed: 
It is particularly important that the thousands of young men 
and women who are brought into Federal jobs not be 
subjected to that type of influence while in the service of the 
Government. One homosexual can po/Jute a Government efface (my 
emphasis).35 
After having dealt extensively over why homosexuals were not to be 
desired for government jobs; the committee recommended enforcing the 
"regulations of the Civil Service Commission," which had always denied 
appointment to "criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously 
disgraceful conduct." Regarding homosexuals who were already working for the 
government, the committee recommended to initiate the process for firing them 
immediately. 
33 Senate Committee on Government Operations, File Destruction in Department of State: 
Hearings on, 83rd Cong., 1 st sess., 19 53, 422. 
34 The following quotes are from Senate, Emplf!Jment of Homosexuals, 5-12. 
35 Ibid. 
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Because it was considered difficult to identify homosexuality in 
individuals by mere sight, the committee recommended to make available to the 
Civil Service Commission information that the FBI and other police agencies 
had, concerning the arrests of individuals on soliciting or public indecency 
charges. This recommendation led to the proposition that a full screening, 
including fingerprinting, be conducted before any individual was appointed to a 
government position. In the case of those who already worked for the 
government, the committee recommended the enforcement of existing Civil 
Service Commission regulations, which were interpreted to ban homosexuals. 
There seemed to be a relative connivance of employed personnel with their 
homosexual coworkers, which the committee identified as the principal obstacle 
for the enforcement of its policies. Once the resignation or expulsion of the 
homosexual worker materialized, the committee advised to cite the real reasons 
of the removal in the employee's file, which was to be kept in a centralized 
archive under the Civil Service Commission. Before any action was taken, the 
accused person had the right to appeal and present his defense. Stemming from 
this procedure, the committee saw it as necessary to gather evidence in the 
shape of psychological examinations and arrest records, before beginning any 
process of removal. 
This report was to govern the handling of homosexuality cases in the 
McCarthy hearings. The revelation that homosexual people could not always be 
identified by their appearance evoked the dangers of the other invisible enemy, 
the communist, while allowing McCarthy to aim for homosexuality when the 
communism of a person could not be proved. Moreover by incorporating 
homosexuals in the Cold War lexicon as security risks, all types of civil right 
violations against them were justified since the potential dangers of letting 
homosexuals get away were perceived to be greater. Unlike previous decades, 
discrete homosexuals could no longer hide under their culture's oblivion; they 
were now studied, analyzed, looked for, and punished. 
In any event, the congressional report on homosexuals was not but the 
legislative culmination of actions taken by the government to rid the capital of 
homosexuals from years before. The State Department, at the Senate 
Appropriations Committee's behest, was laying off homosexuals ever since 
1947 under the label of security risks. This purge was executed slowly but 
steadily, and without much fanfare.36 On February 28, 1950 the deputy 
Undersecretary of State John Peurifoy revealed to the Senate that 91 
homosexuals had been fired from the State Department, to the astonishment of 
many in the congressional body. By this time, the State Department was already 
hard pressed from the accusations of a senator from Wisconsin, who charged 
36 David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 21. 
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the department with harboring communists.37 The accusing senator was Joseph 
McCarthy, and his charges began a more intense phase of the red scare which 
came to be identified \Vith the senator's name; the years of McCarthyism had 
begun. 
McCarthy and the Senate Committee on Government Operations. 
From being an obscure senator from Wisconsin who had been voted the worst 
in the Senate, McCarthy became one of the most popular political figures of 
the early fifties, and a name found in every American history textbook ever 
since.38 The turning point occurred at \"X'heeling, West Virginia. On February 9, 
1950 the senator from Wisconsin gave a speech which came to pass to the 
annals of history as the beginning of McCarthyism.39 Speaking to the Ohio 
Valley Women's Republican Club, McCarthy stated: 
I have here in my hand a list of 205-a list of names that were 
made known to the Secretary of State as being members of 
the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working 
for and shaping policy in the State Department.40 
Although the publication of the speech by the Wheeling Intelligencerdid 
not gain traction at first, within a few days the State Department was asking 
McCarthy for the names of the accused, and news spread around the country.41 
Thenceforth McCarthy became the face of the anti-communist crusade. In the 
same year, General D">ight Eisenhower was elected the first Republican 
president in twenty years, and the Republicans gave McCarthy the chairmanship 
of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations from the Committee on 
Government Operations. According to Roy Cohn, McCarthy's chief counsel in 
37 John Peurifoy's revelations before the senate were made under the context of 
McCarthy's previous accusations. The deputy Undersecretary had denied McCarthy's 
charges, but he had also revealed that the department had gotten rid of 202 security 
risks; eventually the State Department's officer clarified what the term meant and how 
many of these fired employees were homosexuals. For further reference see David K. 
Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 16-17. 
38 Adams, IJ7ithout Precedent, 20. 
39 The term McCarthyism was coined by a cartoonist from the Washington Post named 
Herbert Block (Herblock), who had made a drawing of an elephant representing the 
GOP being led towards standing on a tall pile of buckets of tar, with a barrel on top 
labeled McCarthyism. Adams, Without Precedent, 62; Johnson, Age of Anxiety, pictures. 
40 Arthur Herman, Joseph McCart~y: Reexamining the Life and Legal) of America's Most Hated 
Senator (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 99. 
41 Ibid.; "McCarthy Insists Truman Ousts Reds," New York Times, February 12, 1950, 5. 
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the committee, McCarthy saw the position given to him as a way to divert him 
from his public crusade on communism, but the senator from Wisconsin would 
have none of it. He told the lawyer: 
I fought this Red issue. I won the primary on it, I won the 
election on it, and I don't see anyone else around who intends 
to take it on. You can be sure that as chairman of this 
committee this is going to be my work.42 
As later developments attested, this indeed became McCarthy's work. 
Although the senator did not begin the red scare-neither did he end it- he 
concentrated the efforts around his figure towards eradicating 'un-American' 
activities from the United States. By the time McCarthy assumed his 
chairmanship at the committee on government investigations in 19 53, all of the 
stars were aligned in his favor. The senator counted with unprecedented power 
stemming from the general public's fear and McCarthy's own personal charisma. 
Furthermore as chairman of the subcommittee on investigations the senator 
enjoyed wide latitude to subpoena whom he wanted, and issue contempt and 
public hearing citations as he saw fit. The senator's abrasive personality and 
despotic methods alienated the other members of his committee to a point in 
which many stopped appearing altogether, making his committee a trial of 
one.43 It seemed at this point that the senator would have been able to persecute 
any group that was already out of favor with the public, and homosexuals 
happened to be a group that was not only disliked, but was also being 
prosecuted by the authorities, and considered dangerous for the security of the 
nation. 
Upon becoming chair of both the Subcommittee on Investigations and 
the Committee on Government Operations, the senator gave his position a new 
role description. The committee which previously focused on investigating 
waste and inefficiency in the executive branch of the government became aimed 
at discovering and rooting out subversion. In the two years it functioned 
between 1953 and 1954, more than three hundred witnesses were called upon to 
testify in executive session, and little more than two hundred at the public 
hearings. 44 
42 Roy Cohn, McCartf?y (New York: The New American Library, 1968), 46. 
43 John Adams, Without Precedent, 36-38. 
44 Senate Committee on Government Operations, Executive 5 essions of the 5 enate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, 83rd Cong., 1 st sess., 
1953-1954. Vol. 1, Introduction, xiii. 
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There were no cases from the twenty-five heard in executive session 
that dealt directly with the discovery and prosecution of homosexuality. 
Nevertheless, the question of homosexual people working in the government 
did arise in some unrelated situations, and there was one case in which a witness 
was subpoenaed ·with the committee having prior knowledge of his 
homosexuality. When the mere surfacing of the subject of homosexuality is 
considered, it can be established that there were only three cases that addressed 
the matter.45 Ironically the one event in which homosexuality should have been 
the main issue discussed, was one in which the subject remained fairly mute; by 
this I am referring to the Army-McCarthy hearings.4-0 The first of the cases 
where the subject of homosexuality surfaced was one dealing with the State 
Department's filing system; which I will refer to as the case of the "missing" 
files. 
The case of the "missing" files dealt with the disappearance of 
derogatory material from personnel files of the State Department. At the time 
of the investigation, the Foreign Service Department was undergoing some 
filing reforms of which no written order was previously given. The area 
implementing these reforms was the Performance Measuring Branch (PMB), a 
relatively new organ in charge of preparing personnel records and selecting 
panels that decided on the promotion of personnel. 47 
The formal protocol of the department indicated that derogatory 
information on workers could not be added to the files that the panels received 
45 Senate Committee on Government Operations, Executive Sessions of the Senate Permanent 
SubcoJJJJJJittee on Investigations of the CoJJJJJJittee on GovemJJJent Operations, 83rd Cong., 1 st sess., 
1953-1954. 
46 The subject was mentioned very briefly in relation to a CIA high ranking officer 
named Matthew Baird, however the discussion about Baird's homosexuality did not last 
long. The irony was on the fact that the winning argument for the Army against 
McCarthy was the senator's attempt to exempt Cohn's chief aide David Schine from 
military service. Although not known at the time, Cohn was gay and he was allegedly 
infatuated with Schine, for this reason he named him his aide even when Schine did not 
have enough qualifications. He tried to get Schine exempted from military service when 
the latter was drafted. It is possible that this association between McCarthy and other 
gay people could have been one of the reasons for the senator's "shyness" on the 
prosecution of homosexuals. For further reference see Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, Alleged Threats Against the Chainnan, Vol. 5, 33rd Cong. 1" sess., 
1954, pp. 170-71; On Cohn's homosexuality see Nicholas Von Hoffman, Citizen Cohn 
(New York: Doubleday, 1988), 145-4 7, 188. 
47 Senate Committee on Government Operations, File Destruction in DepartJJJent of State, 
Vol. 1, 83rd Cong. 1" sess., 1954, 283-319. 
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for their decisions on promotions. The rationale behind this practice was that 
PMB was only concerned with the job performance of the personnel, and if 
there was derogatory information on them it was to be handled by security. 
Sometimes derogatory information was still being investigated, so by not 
including that information in the file to be reviewed the worker was protected 
against unwarranted biases. Nevertheless before any applicant was hired or any 
officer or staff member promoted, their files were checked a last time with 
security and according to the results of the investigations carried hitherto, 
security either blocked or confirmed the applicant. 
Since derogatory information was sometimes included in the main file 
of workers, P~ffi removed the derogatory material from the file before it 
prepared it for the promotion panel, and it kept this information in its own area 
until the panel was through with it. This practice created confusion for the 
secretary of the area where the files were being pulled from, and so the case was 
brought to McCarthy's committee. While the derogatory information in 
question was mostly related to a worker's poor performance or some other 
dubious conduct, in the course of the investigation it became obvious that 
some of these files had material on workers' alleged homosexuality. 
McCarthy was interested in the removal of anyone who was a 
homosexual from government positions, and this could be clearly observed in a 
statement he made in relation to an alleged homosexual who had been fired. 
The senator stated: 
We will not make the names of any of the perverts public, 
unless I am outvoted by the committee, but I would like to 
have that name. I may say, one of the reasons for it is that one 
of the men from the American Legion Americanism 
Committee returned from Europe and indicated that 
apparently a sizable number of the perverts who had lost their 
jobs in the State Department had shown up in Paris in jobs 
that paid better, with living conditions better than they are 
here. So, at some time, it will be necessary for us to get the 
names of all the four hundred-some homosexuals who were 
removed from the State Department and find out if they are in 
other government positions where they may be giving this 
government a bad name and bad security risks abroad.48 
48 Senate Committee on Government Operations, Fife Destrnction in Department qfState: 
Hearings on, Vol.1, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, 166. 
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The name of that particular employee McCarthy was interested in finding was 
Thomas Hicock, and it was indicated that he had committed suicide only a week 
after having been fired. 49 
One obstacle for the Senator in any eventual search for homosexuals 
was an executive order issued by President Truman to the Secretary of State in 
April 1952, which stated that no information from the loyalty and security files 
of the State Department could be divulged to a congressional committee. This 
order applied exclusively to employees who were working at the State 
Department at the time of the hearings. Personnel who testified before 
McCarthy were previously given a letter referring to this Presidential order at 
their department as a reminder, and this proved to be something the senator 
could not circumvent. so 
Nevertheless the senator did show interest in making sure that 
homosexuals who had already been fired or were allowed to resign were not 
readmitted. The process for dismissing a homosexual was convoluted, since 
after there was an allegation the accused person could either resign or appeal 
and face the charges with the possibility of being dismissed. If the accused 
person resigned, a letter was kept in the file of the department which did not 
state the specific reason for the departure, since the allegations at that point 
were not proven. This bureaucratic knot was what McCarthy was referring to in 
his aforementioned statement, and under these circumstances the senator asked 
for a list of all former personnel from the State Department, who were allowed 
to resign under allegations of homosexuality.51 
The senator's opinion was that derogatory information, such as 
homosexuality, should always be included in as many files as possible, even if 
this was just alleged, showing that in his world view anyone was guilty until 
proven the contrary. The senator asked about the practice of not keeping 
alleged homosexuality in files to a chief of section of the officer personnel 
named Vladimir Toumanoff: 
49 Ibid. 
Why did you, in your department, think that you should keep 
the homosexuality of an individual from the promotion board? 
On what possible theory would you want to hide the fact that 
this man was a homo?52 
so Ibid., 284. 
51 Ibid., 166, 308. 
52 Ibid., 273. 
The logic behind this practice had to do with the fact that allegations 
did not constitute sufficient evidence for the crime with which the 
employee was accused; as well as the departmental procedure of 
keeping that information outside of the reach of the board members 
deciding on promotion. 
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Although this information may seem to give evidence to the hypothesis 
that McCarthy made it a priority to root out homosexuals from the government, 
the context indicates otherwise. There was not a single witness in this case 
having been subpoenaed because of his or her homosexuality, and there were 
no efforts to find out if there were homosexuals among the current workers. 
One possibility for this was the fact that the senator was impeded from asking 
about particulars on existing employees, stemming from Truman's order. If the 
case is taken as a whole, it becomes clear that the senator was more interested in 
reforming the filing system than in finding homosexuals. McCarthy appeared 
repeatedly frustrated with the filing system throughout the hearings, and he 
always cited as his reason for having the hearings-whether this was true or not-
the need to enact legislation reforming the way employees' files were kept. The 
reform proposed by McCarthy could indeed serve to root out homosexuals, but 
it also served to keep a watch on subversives whom were clearly the object of 
the senator's fancy. 
The ultimate proof of what really interested McCarthy from this case 
was to be found in the subsequent public hearings that followed the 
aforementioned case. The testimony of Mr. Toumanoff revealed that there were 
questions pertaining to his background, since Toumanoff had Russian parents, 
and was born in a Russian Embassy in Turkey in 1923. The testimony of the 
State Department employee was brought to public hearings in hope that he 
turned out to be a communist, showing that even in a case potentially dealing 
with homosexuality, loyalty remained the only focus of the committee.53The 
second case dealing with homosexuality was the only case in which a known 
homosexual was subpoenaed, and it dealt with United States' exports to Austria, 
which were suspected of being deviated to the Soviet zone. 
Deviation of Exports to the Soviet Union. In the case that involved 
the organization in charge of executing the Marshall Plan in Europe, the 
Economic Corporation Administration, could be seen the only known 
homosexual to be called by McCarthy's committee. This was a case that entailed 
an alleged violation of export control statutes, having to do with the shipment 
of "equipment" or "material" by the ECA from the United States to Austria; 
this "material" was found in similar quantities on the Soviet occupied part of 
the European country. The deviation had occurred between 1948 and 1949, and 
an internal investigation was just beginning to being conducted when a 
53 Ibid., (editor's note), 143. 
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gentleman by the name of Eric Kohler resigned. Kohler was comptroller of the 
ECA at the time, and was not even suspected by McCarthy's committee of 
being responsible for ordering the shipment; the reason why he was called upon 
was no other than the fact that the committee knew about his homosexuality. 
Influenced by the previous senate report on homosexuals, McCarthy thought 
that Kohler, being a homosexual, was not going to be able to withstand the 
interrogations. The senator thought that if Kohler had any knowledge on 
possible subversion within his former department, he was going to spill it.54 
McCarthy began the interrogation by making it known to the witness 
that he had "material" reflecting on his "morals," but that he was not interested 
on it "except insofar as it might result in a security risk," since it entered into 
"the question of being able to blackmail a man because of something he has 
done in the past." 
The interrogation rapidly progressed toward Kohler's background and 
the government positions that he had held in his past. It was revealed that at the 
time of the interrogation Kohler was working for the Panama Canal Company 
as a consultant. He had also worked as a comptroller for the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, and had set up an accounting system for the ECA. It was so 
successful it was beginning to be used by other government agencies as well. 
Starting from the assumption that homosexuals recruited other 
homosexuals, the committee repeatedly questioned the recommendations and 
promotions given to, or being given by Kohler. It became clear that not much 
could be gathered from the witness on the deviation of exports to Soviet 
Austria, since he was just an accountant, so uncovering other homosexuals 
working for the government became the committee's plan B. The grilling began 
with no other than chief council Roy Cohn, who was himself a homosexual: 
Mr. Cohn: Let me ask you this, Mr. Kohler. You are a 
homosexual, are you not? 
Mr. Kohler: Well, that has been stated. I think that is the 
conclusion of counsel, yes. 
Mr. Cohn: Well, sir, I put it in the form of a question. Are you 
a homosexual? 
~1r. Kohler: Well, compared with the people that they describe 
to me, I am not. But I am perfectly willing to admit that I am 
for the purposes of your private record here. 55 
54 This and the following references can be found in Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, Violation f!fE:xport Control Statutes: Hearings on, Vol.1, 83rd Cong., lst sess., 
1953, 411-27, 470. 
ss Ibid., 421. 
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In an intervention of this back and forth, McCarthy gave an extensive 
explanation of his position towards homosexuals. Here it is clearly seen that 
McCarthy's issue with gay people was linked to the threat that Soviet espionage 
posed for the American national security. He stated: 
The only reason we are concerned with this, or the principal 
reason, is because it appears to make a man a bad security risk. 
After citing the example of the Austrian officer he added: 
It is an extremely touchy subject; and also I am no psychiatrist 
or psychologist but I understand that there is considerable 
interdependence among people who have that particular 
affliction, if we can call it that, and that they do recruit, often, 
people of the same difficulty to work with them. So it is of 
interest to know who you have got in the government, whether 
you have got anyone else with the same difficulty in the 
government, whether they are still there, and for that reason I 
was giving counsel some latitude in his questioning.56 
The latitude he gave to counsel was seized upon and taken advantage 
of in its entirety. Quickly after McCarthy's washing of hands, Roy Cohn 
presented to Kohler a letter in which he described a man with whom the 
witness had had sex, named Bill. Bill had in fact gone to work for the 
government years later in a position given to him by Mr. Kohler. 
A very interesting exchange between Cohn and Kohler followed in 
regard to the proper definition of a homosexual. Moments before the exchange, 
the witness was asked a question regarding whether he knew any homosexual 
who had ever worked for the government; a trap laid out by Cohn. After Kohler 
answered in the negative he was shown the letter in which he mentioned Bill, to 
which the witness replied that he did not believe Bill that was a homosexual. 
Kohler stated that Bill had a wife and kids, and the fact that he had had sex with 
him did not make him a homosexual, causing the astonishment of the chief 
counsel.57 
56 Ibid., 422. 
57 Although a rushed defense in a compromised situation, this answer also illustrates the 
shift that was going on at the time in the conceptualization of the homosexual; whereas 
in an earlier part of the century heterosexual people could engage in homosexual acts 
without seeing this as a threat to their sexuality, by Cohn's time a homosexual was 
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After Bill was identified other questions followed regarding Kohler's 
associations with other government workers, with no results coming out of the 
witness' mouth. In order to put more pressure on the witness, the chief counsel 
produced a second letter, this time narrating a relationship between Kohler, and 
a sixteen year old boy named Jack Richards to a correspondent named Alex.58 
What is significant about this letter is the extents to which the attorneys 
Cohn and Surine went to humiliate the \v:itness in order to put pressure on him. 
Jack Richards was killed in a car accident only one year before the hearing, and 
it was clear that there was an emotional bond between himself and Kohler. 
Right after the mention of this letter McCarthy jumped in to ask one more time 
about the shipment of material to Austria, of which the witness still had no 
contributions. 
A final push was given by assistant counsel Surine, who tried to 
compromise Kohler's credibility in order to make him talk. Kohler had testified 
that he had not had sexual relations with Jack Richards, and after this Surine 
began to read the letter in question: 
Jack came over tonight while I was in the middle of a shower. 
The bathroom was like a steam room (it was chilly outside) and 
so he insisted on taking his clothes off and joining me under 
the shower, pretending he was chilled through and needed to 
be warmed up. It turned out he'd just taken a bath at home 
before coming over and, furthermore, his hands and feet were 
warm; but he wasn't bothered by excuses. He never is. His final 
reason was, and that one I couldn't shake because it was 
somewhere near the truth, that he couldn't stand it being 
outside with me inside, and besides he couldn't trust me in 
there by myself. I needed protection, apparently, from myself. 
This isn't the first time he's fathered me.59 
Kohler still denied that he had ever had sex with Jack, and stated that the letter 
did not prove that. He was astonished and at one point he asked, "I wonder if 
all of this detail has to be read. I think it is terrible." 
Further questions dealt with Kohler's life as a homosexual, and the 
information contained in his letters that referred to his 'cruising' the public 
parks and Times Square in New York, as well as his relationships with "fairies" 
anyone who had ever had sex with someone of the same sex. This shift is developed in 
more detail in Chauncey's Gay New York, 21. 
ss The following quotes can be found in Senate Committee, Violation of E::..port, 429-50. 
s9 Ibid., 436-7. 
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and "queers."60 Later in his testimony Kohler declared that these letters were an 
exercise of his imagination, which he did as a literary practice to release the 
stresses of his demanding work. After this one testimony Kohler was released 
and his hearing was not made public. 
Although the methods used to question the witness were cruel, 
Kohler's case proves once again that McCarthy's committee was not all that 
'obsessed' with homosexuals. The main goal of the questioning was to soften 
Kohler so that he could spill his secrets on the misappropriation of the Austrian 
exports. It is true that the witness was asked about other government employees 
being homosexuals, but it is difficult to assess how much of this was aimed at 
rooting out 'sexual deviants' and how much was used for the purpose of 
breaking the witness. The fact is that Cohn and Surnine could not get any 
names other than Bill, and they did not follow up on acquiring names even 
when it became obvious that the witness was lying. Kohler was not called for 
contempt when he could have been, and the case for which he was subpoenaed 
followed long after the witness was released from having to testify, showing that 
indeed Kohler's 'literary exercise' defense proved enough to satisfy McCarthy. 
Furthermore, Kohler did not seem to have been bothered again. Haynes 
Johnson stated that Kohler's identity as a homosexual was never revealed, and 
he was able to live a discrete life serving as a trustee at Chicago's Roosevelt 
University. His colleagues at the university as well as many other acquaintances 
only learned about his sexual orientation after the records of McCarthy's 
committee were made public in 2003.61 
As in the case of the missing files, McCarthy's committee showed what 
it was really looking for when it asked Kohler about a comment he made in his 
youth concerning the "Russian idea." The committee suggested that Kohler had 
shown sympathy to Soviet consumer practices. The discussion about the 
witness' possible inclinations toward communism preceded and was interposed 
with the grilling he got for being homosexual. In the same letter displaying the 
Russian idea, Kohler had also stated that the Russian oligarchy was no more or 
less greedy than the American Congress or Administration. It is well known 
how these innocent comments were interpreted by McCarthy's inquisitorial 
committee; nevertheless the witness was able to explain himself and seemed to 
60 This information shows that Kohler was a very typical homosexual of his time, since 
he frequented the places where gay people discretely gathered and used names that 
identified gender variations within the gay subcultures, with queers being the masculine 
homosexual men and fairies the feminine. For a further discussion of this refer to 
Chauncey, Gqy New York, 15~ 16. 
61 Johnson, Age of Anxiety, 329. 
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have been taken at his word. 62 Another interesting fact about McCarthy's team 
was that it was not always to identify gay people well, and Dimitry Varley's case 
was an example of this. Varley's was the last of the cases dealing with 
homosexuality. 
Communist Infiltration in the U.N. Within the context of a 
perceived communist association of many United Nations' employees, 
McCarthy's committee cited Dimitry Varley, who was a senior officer for the 
Department of Economic Affairs. Varley's hearing was typical of most 
witnesses who underwent McCarthy's chamber; he was suspected of 
communism stemming from his previous membership in organizations labeled 
as subversive by the Attorney General. The list of Varley's 'sins' exhibited an 
association with someone who worked for the Dai!J Worker, a contribution 
made to the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, a membership to the 
American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, as well one to the 
Labor Party, and a previous subscription to In Fact, which was a communist 
bulletin.63 
One thing was unusual about Varley's hearing, and that was the 
implication made against the witness that he was a homosexual. Although the 
word homosexual was never said, McCarthy's chief counsel Roy Cohn asked the 
witness whether he had ever been arrested "on moral charges," in an arrest 
made in the "men's room" where the witness was found "with another man." 
Much to the surprise of the committee, Varley denied that such an occurrence 
ever took place, even under Coho's threat that he had a police report on it. 
Apparently Varley had even paid the "other man's fine," a fact that even the 
witness corroborated. 
According to Varley, he was given a fine for loitering. He also explained 
that the man he paid the fine for could not afford his fine. Varley had never met 
this other man other than in court, and he only paid his fine as a gesture of 
charity; thus according to Varley's testimony, Cohn's accusations had been 
inaccurate. Following his testimony, Varley was threatened with a contempt 
citation, with McCarthy stating that what the witness was committing "a clear 
case of perjury." As the hearings continued after a recess, the 'incident in the 
men's restroom' was not mentioned again, and Cohn proceeded to ask Varley 
about his other "communist" associations. 
Varley's case shows just how incompetent McCarthy and his team were. 
It became obvious that Cohn had not done his research, and it ended up costing 
McCarthy the hearing. Dimitry Varley was a high profile functionary at the 
62 Senate Committee, Violation ef Export, 420-28. 
63 This and the following references stem from the Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, Security-United Nations: Hearings on, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1849-76. 
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United Nations, as evidenced by his high wage of $ 12,000 a year. McCarthy 
more than likely wanted a high ranking U.N. Functionary for a public hearing. 
The comments that he made to the press after the executive hearing, as well as 
his request to the United Nations for Varley's dismissal prove it. The 
functionary was never cited for a public hearing.64 This case and the former 
ones also speak to the connection that existed between communism and 
homosexuality in McCarthy's mind. About this linkage David Johnson stated 
that "homosexuality" for the senator "was the psychological maladjustment that 
led people toward communism." Johnson argues that even though the senator 
from Wisconsin did not persecute many homosexuals himself, he was still very 
instrumental in creating the homosexual-communist linkage in the public's 
mind.65 
Conclusions. The climate of fear and anxiety of the postwar years 
created a fertile ground for the red and lavender scares to develop. Within this 
environment a legal infrastructure developed, in which congress expanded the 
power of its hearings by appropriating judicial powers and circumventing the 
Constitution. Joseph McCarthy exploited this environment for his own political 
ascension, which he used to acquire political capital. It is widely known that 
McCarthy used most of his power for the persecution of communists; however 
it has not always been clear if the senator used his power to attack homosexuals. 
The lavender scare was not started by McCarthy, rather it developed out 
of the mixture of long held stereotypes towards homosexuals, the political 
climate of the first years of the Cold War, and the greater awareness of the 
existence of gays and lesbians. As it has been stated, the government was 
concerned with ridding its offices of homosexuals years before McCarthy rose 
to fame; however, it could be argued that the rise of the senator gave strength 
to a more acute phase of the lavender scare, in which the government both 
intensified and became more open in its prosecutions against gays and lesbians. 
After all, Peurifoy's revelations that encouraged the congressional report on 
homosexuals, were produced from the officer's denials of McCarthy's 
communist charges against the State Department. The senator was not silent on 
the issue of homosexuals, as he was known to have claimed that the State 
Department was "honeycombed with homosexuals," and that homosexuality 
could lead to communism.66 
Nevertheless, being part of the environment that intensified the 
persecution of homosexuals is not the same as being the one who persecuted 
homosexuals, and this latter is ultimately the issue. When taking all of the 
64 Ibid., (editor's note), 1833. 
65 David K.Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 16-19. 
66 Hank Greenspun, Where I Stand, Las Vegas Sun, October 25, 1952. 
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contextual factors into consideration it becomes evident that McCarthy could 
have aimed the committee toward homosexuals, since he had the legal power as 
chairman of the committee on government operations, and the popular support 
as an anti-communist crusader. Furthermore gays and lesbians did have the 
sympathy of the public in general, and homosexuals were already declared to be 
security risks for the nation. According to David Johnson, McCarthy had been 
advised by Republican senator Styles Bridges through a speech he gave in 
McCarthy's home state, to redirect his crusade from communists to other "bad 
security risks" such as drunkards, criminals and homosexuals, since these were 
easier to find.67 Notwithstanding these pressures, a closer scrutiny of the actions 
of the senator demonstrates that he did not seek out gays and lesbians, as even 
many gay people from his own time thought he did. The small number of cases 
in which homosexuality was even mentioned in McCarthy's committee, coupled 
with the non-existent contempt citations or public hearings given to 
homosexuals by the senator make his restraint clear. This position is even better 
illustrated when McCarthy had the chance to participate in a previous 
congressional committee set to weed out homosexuals from the government, 
and he chose not to do it by recusing himself from being part of the 
investigations. 
The reasons for the senator's passivity in the lavender scare may be a 
subject for further research. Nevertheless, rumors about McCarthy's own 
sexuality as well as facts concerning the homosexuality of his chief counsel Roy 
Cohn could reasonably be part of the explanation, and accordingly McCarthy's 
reticence could be seen as a move to avoid a type of 'boomerang' effect.68 In 
any event the damage that gay and lesbian people suffered during this time is 
immeasurable, and clearly the senator was not on the right side of history. 
Paradoxically at this very same time of opprobrium the first seeds of the gay 
and lesbian liberation movement were planted, in the birth of the first gay 
rights' organization named the Mattachine Society.69 
67 David Johnson, Lavender Scare, 23. 
68 Referent to these allegations Hank Greenspun stated that "Joe McCarthy is a bachelor 
of 43 years. He seldom dates girls and if he does, he laughingly describes it as window 
dressing," as cited from Hank Greenspun, Where I Stand, Las Vegas Sun, October 25, 
1952; Von Hoffman, Citizen Cohn, 186, 226, 322, 362-78; David K Johnson, The 
Lavender Scare, 3; Herman, McCarthy, 14. 
69 David K Johnson, The Lavender Scare, 13-14; D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, 58. 
